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Changing Sovereignty Games and
International Migration
ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG*
In this article, Professor Zolberg argues that today's
immigration issues should be analyzed within their historical bases.
He follows the formation of the modern State, with particular focus
on the legal and political meaning of "sovereignty" as understood
in pre-colonial times down to the World War II period. He next
identifies several late twentieth century phenomena in Europe and
elsewhere, many of which pose serious challenges to long-standing
notions of nationhood and citizenship. The author concludes that
despite the recent development of borderless markets and
communication infrastructures, much remains to be done to build a
truly global community.
I. INTRODUCTION
The demographic perspective leaves no doubt as to the importance of
migration as a social process: the outward and inward movement of
individuals is one of the three constitutive processes of any population, the
others being birth and death. But this perspective does not help us to
elucidate how movement from one country to another differs from all other
kinds of movement. Rather, it is the political organization of world space
into mutually exclusive sovereignties that delineates the specificity of
international migration. Viewed from this angle, international migration is
a historically-bound phenomenon, arising from the advent of territorial
sovereignty as the dominant form of political organization-in short, with
modernity. International migration is distinct from the process whereby
individuals constantly redistribute themselves across space by moving short
or long distances within the cbnfines of the State to which they belong. The
distinctive feature of international migration arises not from the nature of the
movement, but rather from the fact that it entails a transfer from the
jurisdiction of one sovereign to another. If the transfer becomes permanent,
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it constitutes a deviation from the norm in terms of which the world is
politically organized. That norm is reflected not only in the popular
conception of a world consisting of countries considered as natural entities,
but also in the conceptual apparatus of the social sciences--except for
anthropology-which is predicated on the notion of "society" as a
territorially-based, self-reproducing cultural and social system whose human
population is assumed to renew itself endogenously over an indefinite
period.
Concomitantly, given the motility of the human species from its earliest
origins and its adaptability to life in the broadest range of environments, the
capacity to control movement is a requisite for the effective exercise of any
sort of authority. This is especially crucial when authority is defined in
territorial terms, as in the case of the modem State. This article tracks the
historical backdrop against which modem immigration policy must be
viewed, beginning with a discussion of pre-monarchist Europe and the early
United States, then moving to the dramatic developments of the twentieth
century, including decolonization. Next, several contemporary phenomena
are examined which, taken together, lead to the conclusion that though many
nations may seek to achieve closure of their borders, new immigration is
likely to persist.
II. FORMATION OF THE MODERN MIGRATION REGIME
As suggested by Perry Anderson, the transition from the manorial
economy to the modem State (a label I prefer to "absolutist") entailed a
recasting of the carapace of control at the level of the larger territory, one
more appropriate to the new scale of economic activity.' However, John
Ruggie has pointed out that the transformation was not determined by
economic processes alone: there was a change in what he terms the "social
episteme," the establishment of a single subjectivity to which all others are
subordinate, represented, for example, in the development of single-point
perspective in art and its rapid rise to hegemony in representation.2
i. PERRY ANDERSON, LINEAGES OF THE ABSOLUTiST STATE (1974).
2. John G. Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International
Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139, 157 (1993); see also J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the
Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations, 48 INT'L ORG. 107
(1994).
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Internal movement within most European States became generally free
(in contrast to the situation in States where serfdom persisted, such as the
Tsarist empire, or in slave colonies)-but with controls on vagrancy and the
like. Concomitantly, with the drastic reduction of overlapping networks of
authority to a single hierarchy, the distinction between mutually exclusive
subjects was sharpened.
Modem notions of sovereignty, in Bodin as well as in Hobbes, very
much reflect these notions. For Bodin there is no strength but of men. For
the mercantilist-bellicist State, human capital was of the essence; thus, from
this perspective the most important form of control pertained to the outward
movement of its populace. The State sought to retain its human capital for
economic production and war. Accordingly, in the first centuries of the
modem State's existence unauthorized emigration was tantamount to treason
and was punishable by death or enslavement. The resilience of this concept
is confirmed by its persistence, in more recent times, as the hallmark of the
"totalitarian" States.
These mechanisms are historically bound. Seventeenth-century Europe
was clearly divided into mutually exclusive State-like territories, ranging
from large kingdoms to small principalities. Much of the overseas world
was organized in this manner as well, where territory was either part of
established non-European empires (e.g., the Ottoman Empire or China) or
under the colonial control of Europeans. The "frontier" was Africa.
Movement from Europe to the colonies was by and large regulated by the
controlling sovereign in accordance with changing assessments of the
interests and relative strength of the contending parties. However, an
exception was Britain's North American colonies, which did receive, or
rather import, foreign servants, particularly from some of the poorer German
states.
Under prevailing socio-technological conditions, reinforced by
regulations, there was in fact relatively little emigration and hence
immigration did not constitute a major problem. Indeed, mercantilist States
were acquisitive of human capital. Facing conditions of limited population
growth and general scarcity, in addition to promoting population growth,
States tended to prey on each other with regard to population and to take
advantage of opportunities to acquire valuable persons. This was one reason
for welcoming "refugees" persecuted by enemy States. Statesmanship and
humanitarianism went hand in hand. Nevertheless, theorists insisted that the
sovereign's security required the exercise of control over inward movement
1994l
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lest a potential invader be able to enter unchecked. This was clearly spelled
out in the earliest elaborations of international law.3
Yet, there were stirrings in the North American colonies regarding who
might be let in. Before the Revolution, grievances arose between the
colonials and the Crown over two crucial aspects of immigration: on the
negative side, the colonies claimed the right to exclude
undesirables-notably Catholics, paupers, and felons; on the positive side,
they claimed the right to naturalize desirable settlers who were not British
subjects. It is noteworthy that some of these grievances were spelled out in
the Declaration of Independence as arguments in support of the quest for
sovereignty.
Already incipient in the Colonial period, this situation was
fundamentally altered by the formation of the United States-an independent
overseas republic controlled by people of European descent which, on the
whole, welcomed substantial immigration of putative settlers and workers
from Great Britain and select Protestant countries on the continent. Despite
some setbacks, the new country acted as a magnet, particularly for members
of the "middling classes" of society, because it afforded the possibility of
acquiring land at a much lower price than anywhere in Europe. In Europe
this precipitated an emigration crisis to which all sovereigns (including the
Swiss cantons and German principalities) responded by reinforcing sanctions
against unauthorized departure.
Yet, around the same time, the characteristic Enlightenment emphasis
on the individual undermined the sovereigns' attempts to prevent exit. The
early documents of the French Revolution (possibly early versions of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) proclaimed the right
to stay, to leave, and to return to France. From the documents it is unclear
how extensively the drafters intended to apply what came to be known in
nineteenth-century legal lexicon as the "right of expatriation." This right
turns out to be subversive to sovereignty, as demonstrated by a simple
query: what sort of "sovereignty" remains if individuals exercise an
unlimited right to move out? The obvious result would be "sovereignty"
over an empty land-as indeed nearly came to pass in the German
Democratic Republic (GDR) in the late summer of 1989, when Hungary
3. RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW (1972).
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opened its border to Austria and citizens of the GDR drove their sputtering
Trabants to freedom.
It has often been pointed out that there is no concomitant "right to
enter." The vital importance of this asymmetry is brought home now, when,
for the first time in the history of the State system, the right to leave has
become nearly unfettered.
In recent years a number of theorists have explored this theme from the
perspective of liberal theory.' Although much of the contemporary debate
is cast in terms of "communitarian" versus "individual" perspectives, Nardin
points out the importance of the "realist" perspective.' This is in keeping
with my own understanding, derived from the century-old insight of Henry
Sidgwick, that the single most important source of difference among
positions arose from the "national" versus the "cosmopolitan" perspective.'
Briefly, to the extent liberalism is embedded in the modem State system
there is a fundamental ground for limiting incoming movement: the security
of the sovereign's territory. This is genuinely irreducible.
This proposition is supported by the historical unfolding of U.S. doctrine
regarding immigration control. To begin with, the U.S. Constitution
established what has been termed a "negative pregnant" regarding the
importation of slaves-that is, by specifying that Congress could make no
law prohibiting such importation prior to 1808, it in effect affirmed its
authority to regulate importation after 1808.7 It is now understood that this
was designed not only to limit slavery, but also to restrict the expansion of
the country's non-white population and, in effect, to decidedly shift the
balance to the white side.8 Although this would not prevent voluntary
movement from Africa, the possibility was ruled out by prevailing
circumstances. In any case the conception of the U.S. body politic as white-
only was clearly indicated by the enactment of a naturalization law by the
very first Congress restricting candidates to the "free and white."
4. A useful summary of the range of positions is provided by Terry Nardin, Alternative Ethical
Perspectives on Transnational Migration, in FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL
MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 267 (Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds., 1992).
5. Id. at 271-72, 277-78.
6. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 309 (4th ed. Macmillan 1919).
7. Don E. Fehrenbacher, Slavery, The Framers and The Living Constitution, in SLAVERY AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES: THE CONSTITUTION, EQUALITY, AND RACE I, 10-11 (Robert A. Goldwin and Art
Kaufman eds., 1988).
8. See, e.g., DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-
1823 (1975).
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Although the fact that the Constitution vests the authority to enact
naturalization laws in Congress suggests that sovereignty lay at the
congressional level, the concept of "sovereignty" in the United States was
made ambiguous by the existence of states and the insistence on the states'
right to exercise "police powers" over slavery issues. This, in turn, very
much affected the way in which immigration law and policy was carried out
in the antebellum period. Contrary to the usual view that the absence of
federal legislation prior to the act of March 3, 1875,' which among other
things prohibited the importation of Chinese women for "lewd or immoral
purposes," reflected a consensus among law-makers on "laissez-faire," I
suggest the following: (1) there was no consensus, but rather a protracted
conflict marked by periods of more explicit confrontation in which the
forces of nascent capitalism were triumphant; (2) the balance of forces made
for "managed" or "qualified" laissez-faire, but for reasons arising from the
slavery issue this was reflected in legislation at the state and local level
rather than at the federal level; and (3) despite constitutional obstacles, some
non-laissez-faire legislation, designed to indirectly limit immigration, was
enacted at the national level.'0
For present purposes, the most significant development arose during the
first third of the nineteenth century. During this period U.S. leaders
emphasized two related objectives: (1) to promote the freedom of
movement of individuals living in other countries so they could emigrate to
the United States; and (2) to regulate entry so as to exclude those deemed
undesirable.
However, because of constitutional constraints on the exercise of "police
powers" by the federal government, the landing of persons was regulated
exclusively by state laws. Anticipating contemporary debates, these were
designed mostly to prevent the immigration of criminals and paupers who,
Americans believed, were being dumped on their shores by malicious
European schemers.
The most explicit justification of immigration restriction in U.S.
constitutional doctrine appears in Mayor of New York v. Miln," which was
9. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974).
10. This is the theme of my forthcoming book, tentatively entitled, THE MAIN GATE AND THE
BACK DOOR.
11. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837). The background and context are discussed
in Edward F. Tuerk, The Supreme Court and Public Policy: The Regulation of Immigration, 1820-32,
at 4-22 (1951) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago).
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decided by the Supreme Court in 1837, a time when the arrival of a mass
of destitute Irish immigrants in the midst of a U.S. depression provoked
considerable agitation and triggered efforts to reduce the flow. The case
involved an 1824 New York law, designed to prevent the landing of
foreigners deemed incapable of maintaining themselves, which required
shippers to post bond on behalf of their passengers. The law was challenged
by one of the shipping companies on grounds that the state lacked the right
to regulate interstate and international commerce. However, the Court,
under the leadership of Justice Taney, bypassed the commerce issue
altogether and upheld the law on the basis of the state's police powers, an
outcome which, incidentally, signaled a reversal of the Court's steadfast
support of the growth of national power and a turn toward states' rights
more generally.
It is especially noteworthy that the Court went out of its way to specify
that the power of any state to regulate entry was a concomitant of its
sovereignty, which originated in the law of nations, and hence pre-existed
any written constitution or statute.12 Invoking the authority of Emmerich
de Vattel, the eighteenth-century theorist who founded the law of nations on
"natural law," Justice Barbour stated that "[t]he Sovereign may forbid the
entrance of his territory, either to foreigners in general, or in particular
cases, to certain persons, or for certain particular purposes, according as he
may think it advantageous to the state . . . ." He quoted further, "[s]ince
the lord of the territory may, whenever he thinks proper, forbid its being
entered, he has, no doubt, a power to annex what conditions he pleases, to
the permission to enter."' 4 The several American states therefore possessed
this authority before the adoption of the Constitution; and, lying in the realm
of police power, it was not taken away from them in 1787.
The "advantage of the state" is to be construed broadly to mean more
than security in the narrow sense. Commenting on the substantive problems
that prompted New York to enact the measure under consideration, Justice
Barbour pointed out that the act was "obviously passed with a view to
prevent [New York's] citizens from being oppressed by the support of
multitudes of poor persons, who come from foreign countries without
possessing the means of supporting themselves," and concluded that "[t]here
12. Miln, 36 U.S. at 132.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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can be no mode in which the power to regulate internal police could be
more appropriately exercised."' 5 In his peroration, he moved beyond a
discussion of economic costs toward broader cultural and political concerns,
suggesting that restriction of entry was the moral equivalent of medical
quarantine:
We think it as competent and as necessary for a state to provide
precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers,
vagabonds, and possibly convicts, as it is to guard against the
physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious
articles imported, or from a ship, the crew of which may be laboring
under an infectious disease. 6
It was not the first time immigration was thus related to "infection."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thompson was even more emphatic:
Can anything fall more directly within the police power and internal
regulation of state, than that which concerns the care and
management of paupers or convicts or any other class or description
of persons that may be thrown into the country, and likely to
endanger its safety, or become chargeable for their maintenance?.
. . [I]f all power to guard against these mischiefs is taken away, the
safety and welfare of the community may be very much
endangered. "
Anticipating the economic and political arguments formulated by today's
advocates of the "national principles" such as Sidgwick and communitarians
such as Walzer, the Supreme Court's justification for restricting entry
included the issue of security. Barbour's reference to the law of nations is
crucial in this respect: control over immigration is a concomitant of the
exercise of sovereignty because there is no way for States to prevent any
potential invader from marching in posing as an immigrant unless they can
restrain the movement of persons across their borders. Although this might
be thought of as a pre-liberal principle, it cannot be ignored by liberal
theory so long as liberal States exist in a world that is organized into a
system of States.
15. Id. at 141.
16. Id. at 142-43.
17. Id. at 148 (Thompson, J., concurring).
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The nationalization of the State-its transformation into a community
whose members share a common origin and a common fate, coupled with
the idea of sovereignty residing in the "peoples" into which the world is
divided-further enhanced the character of immigration as a disturbance.
In relation to a self-representation, in which exists considerable and growing
differentiation based on occupation, residence, class, and the like, fictive
kinship is perceived as the major determinant of identity. Those coming in
from outside are "others." The official U.S. designation, "aliens," indicated
this as well. This is further confirmed by the distinction that has arisen in
the laws of many countries between such "others" and outsiders who are
members of the national tribe by reason of their ancestral origin-ironically,
a distinction most explicitly espoused in recent times by Germany and
Israel, but also acknowledged by the United Kingdom ("partials") as well
as Italy and Spain.' 8  Despite contentions that U.S. nationality is
conceptualized on a political rather than ethnic basis, this sort of concern
underlies not only the racist conception of citizenship noted earlier, which
prevailed until the mid-twentieth century, but also the "national origins"
system established to regulate immigration in the 1920s. Somewhat similar
policies prevailed in Canada and Australia. Today, these policies persist in
Canada, where within the "point" system positive weight is given to
language competence in one of the two languages of the "founding"
nationalities, British and French. 9
This too has to do with sovereignty, and particularly with the distinction
emphasized by Barkin and Cronin between "State" sovereignty and
"national" sovereignty.20 But contrary to their contention that the period
since the rise of the State has been marked by cyclical movement from one
type of sovereignty to the other in a reactive way, I would suggest that at
all times sovereignty is founded on a mix of the two.
States' aspirations to achieve control of population movement were
substantially achieved only in the wake of World War I, with the
establishment of a worldwide system of border controls based on "zero
immigration." It is a reflection of this that Hannah Arendt observed in The
18. DANIEL KUBAT, THE POLITICS OF MIGRATION POLICIES (2nd ed. 1993).
19. David Reimers and Harold Troper, Canadian and American Immigratien Policy Since 1945,
in IMMIGRATION, LANGUAGE, AND ETHNICITY: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 37 (Barry R.
Chiswick ed., 1992).
20. Barkin and Cronin, supra note 2, at 108.
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Origins of Totalitarianism that "theoretically sovereignty is nowhere more
absolute than in matters of 'emigration, naturalization, nationality and
expulsion."'2
III. EMERGING "SOVEREIGNTY GAMES" IN THE LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
Paradoxically, in the last third of the twentieth century, when the statist
utopia was finally actualized with the disintegration of the remaining
empires, the reorganization of amalgams of earlier settlements, and the
accession of their fragments to the status of "sovereign States," the
normative principles on which the statist system rests were themselves
subject to unprecedented challenges. Reflecting the dynamics of markets,
economic actors worldwide are challenging boundaries and have already
achieved significant successes in bringing into being transnational regimes
and institutions such as "common markets" or quasi-extraterritorial
"development zones" which, by their very existence, impose constraints on
statist absolutism. From a perspective reflecting the globalization of liberal
norms, humanitarians have also achieved significant successes in enhancing
individual rights on a transnational level by institutionalizing a variety of
humanitarian regimes as well as transnational institutions that impose
constraints on States. In light of these developments, while there is no
reason to expect the disappearance of the State form, there is every reason
to expect it will be increasingly relativized. That is to say, it will share
normative and institutional space with other formations. But the statist
system also leaves us with a burdensome legacy of a proliferation of entities
that are sovereign States in name, but which lack the capacity to provide
their citizens with protection from violence, a function that legitimizes the
very existence of a sovereign.
A. The Right to Leave
The right to leave a country reduces sovereign authority over territory,
but only conditionally over individuals. As mentioned earlier, this right to
21. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 278 (1973). For an elaboration of her
insight, see Aristide R. Zolberg, The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating Process, 467
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 24 (1983).
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leave creates a crisis on the immigration side. Since the end of World War
II, the right to leave has been forcefully asserted, most notably in article
13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,22 and more recently
in the Helsinki Declaration.23 Furthermore, decolonization has also
entailed its extension to many millions of former colonial subjects whose
movement was previously limited. Moreover, preliminary investigation
suggests that this right to leave has also been broadened steadily to mean
not only physical departure, but the right to relinquish one's obligations to
the State of origin-that is, the right of expatriation. If the above analysis
is correct, this amounts to a very extensive and unprecedented qualification
of sovereignty, which is by now close to universal. Of course, the point has
been made regarding human rights more generally, but this particular one
is especially relevant.
Related to this is the vast expansion of the authorization to travel with
only minimal regulation. As those concerned with controlling unauthorized
immigration are well aware, a large proportion of it is attributable not so
much to surreptitious entry as to legal entry followed by overstaying. Thus,
by extending tourist facilities, States in effect acquiesce to some reduction
in their policing capacity. An extreme form of this is the right of "First
World" citizens to travel just about anywhere on the authority of their
passports alone, without any special permission in the form of an advance
visa from the States they enter. This constitutes a form of hyper-
individualism.
B. Resurgence of Multiple Membership
It is no surprise that there is talk about "the new Middle Ages."24
Among the industrial democracies as well as in the ex-Communist countries
and the developing world, the monopolistic claims of the sovereign States
over their subjects-citizens are increasingly questioned. The most dramatic
instances involve direct challenges to the State in the name of alternative
national identities, as in the case of the Catalans in Spain, the Flemish in
Belgium, or the Ukrainians in the former Soviet Union. Indeed, more new
22. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(111), Dec. 10, 1948.
23. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Concluding Document form the Vienna
Meeting, Jan. 17, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 527 (1989).
24. See, e.g., ALAIN MINC, LE NOUVEAU MOYEN AGE (1993).
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States have been admitted to the United Nations General Assembly in the
past five years than at any time since the great wave of African
decolonization in the early 1960s. However, as one would expect of
parvenus, the newcomers tend to be particularly vigilant regarding their
sovereignty claims so that, in keeping with Arendt's insight noted earlier,
the multiplication of units could result in more restrictive conditions for
individual rights than before.
Over the longer term, two other processes might erode the sovereignty
of both old and new States. One is the growing importance of vocational
and occupational affiliations that transcend national borders, especially
professional and artistic networks, which provide the making of incipient
cosmopolitan communities. The other is the emergence of transnational
communities as the result of international migration. In contrast with the
older "zero-sum" vision of migrants who reduce their commitment to the
country of origin as they increase their stake in the host country, today, it
is quite literally possible for individuals to live in more than one place at
once. Mexicans, Central Americans, and Caribbean islanders in the United
States, Turks in Germany, and Algerians in France all manage to do this
quite well on an everyday basis, sometimes over several generations."
These modem diasporas are obviously facilitated by technological and
economic conditions, but their development goes hand-in-hand with changes
in the "social episteme," which no longer views nationality, or even
citizenship, as necessarily exclusive of membership in para-State groups.
The proliferation of de facto multiple memberships, including also the
considerable increase in marriages among nationals of different countries,
has resulted in a growing number of formal holders of dual nationality.
Moreover, many recent immigrants who would like to become citizens of
the host country are reluctant to give up their nationality of origin, not only
for reasons of identity, but often also on practical grounds, such as the
desire to maintain eligibility for land ownership and inheritance. This is
reportedly the case for both Turks in Germany and Dominicans in the
United States. Despite their traditional insistence on the mutually exclusive
nature of citizenship, many States-including the United States-appear
willing to quietly accommodate the changing needs of their citizens or
25. For a suggestive conceptualization of this phenomenon, as well as a set of interesting case
studies, see TOWARDS A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MIGRATION: RACE, CLASS, ETHNICITY, AND
NATIONALISM RECONSIDERED (Nina Glick Schiller et al. eds., 1992).
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prospective citizens, so long as it does not involve problems of security.
The facilitation of multiple citizenship is currently under active discussion
in the Council of Europe, and it might be anticipated that the subject will
receive increasing attention in coming years on this side of the Atlantic as
well.26
C. Emergence of Non-State Complexes, Especially the European Union
From the perspective of sovereignty, the evolving European Union (EU)
is an unambiguous entity; in relation to the world that States have
constructed over the past four centuries, it constitutes, as Ruggie has
suggested, a truly "post-modem" innovation.27 Although formal citizenship
remains vested at the level of the States, there has been considerable
movement toward the formation of a European "quasi-citizenship," denoted
symbolically and practically by the adoption of uniform passports by all the
Member States and the institution of European Union entry gates at airports.
Despite some delay, attributable to the States' residual reluctance to give up
control of national boundaries and to the fear of illegal entry by persons
from outside the EU, citizens of the Member States circulate freely
throughout the region and can virtually work in any country without special
permits. To this has now been added the right to vote in municipal
elections of their country of residence. Although the experience of the EU
is so far unique, it prefigures possible developments in other regional
common markets, including NAFTA. Canadian citizens and U.S. citizens
are already admitted as visitors in each other's country on the basis of
ordinary identification, without visas or passports, and it is not far-fetched
to suggest that special arrangements will be made in the foreseeable future
for Mexicans as well.
D. Human Rights
In her classic analysis of totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt traced its roots
to the nationalization of human rights. Implied in the working system of
26. For an overview of recent development in this sphere, see THOMAS HAMAR, DEMOCRACY AND
THE NATION STATES: ALIENS, DENIZENS AND CITIZENS IN A WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
106-24 (1990).
27. Ruggie, supra note 2, at 152.
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nation-states from the very outset, she argues, was "that only nationals could
be citizens, only people of the same national origin could enjoy the full
protection of legal institutions, that persons of different nationality needed
some law of exception until or unless they were completely assimilated and
divorced from their origins."28 However, since the emergence of nation-
states coincided historically with the development of constitutional
government, the inherent dangers of linking rights with nationality remained
hidden from view until World War I and its consequences "sufficiently
shattered the facade of Europe's political system to lay bare its hidden
frame. 29 Out of this "two victim groups emerged whose sufferings were
different from those of all others in the era between the wars," the national
minorities in the "successor States" and the Stateless.30
It was precisely the experience of these sufferings that provided the
impetus to reverse the previous historical trend in the wake of World War
II by developing a doctrine of "human rights," which was successfully
operationalized by way of a multitude of legal instruments at the national
and international levels. More recently, however, what began as a mere
internationalization of human rights, whereby States undertake to respect the
rights of individuals within their jurisdiction as a condition for membership
in the international community, has evolved further into a globalization of
these rights, in the sense that they are seen to arise in the membership of all
individuals in the human species. This amounts to a rudimentary form of
citizenship in a Kantian cosmopolitan polity in the making, a notion that
entails the concomitant imposition of significant limits on State
sovereignty.3'
Although the operational effects of cosmopolitan citizenship fall far
short of the right of anyone to enter and settle in any country, in the post-
World War II period the international community began to recognize a
limited form of such a right for those whose rights had been violated in their
country of origin. Instituted for Europe by way of the Geneva Convention
in 1951 and expanded to encompass the whole world in 1967, the
international refugee regime was originally grounded in a narrow
construction of the notion of refugee as a person outside his or her country
28. ARENDT, supra note 21, at 275.
29. Id. at 267.
30. Id. at 268.
31. Nardin, supra note 4, at 268-69.
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and deprived of protection from the State of origin because of reasonable
fear of persecution.3 2 Among the western liberal democracies, in practice
refugee status was attributed mostly to persons originating in Communist
countries.33 Although "persecution" is still the prevailing core of the
refugee regime at both the national and international levels, in recent years
a number of international lawyers, notably James Hathaway, have argued
that the status of "refugee" should be grounded in the more expansive
concept of "deprivation of human rights," as operationalized in existing legal
instruments.34 While this innovative approach has not yet been widely
accepted, its career might be bolstered by the doctrinal deficit that has arisen
in the refugee sphere since the end of the Cold War.
E. Challenges to Sovereignty from Below
Federal States inherently tolerate a certain degree of ambiguity with
regard to sovereignty. That is, State authority is seen from within as
frangible, with the possibility that authority will become allocated at
different societal levels along functional lines; viewed from the outside,
however, States normally function as unitary formations in relation to other
States and are surely expected by other States to do so. How this ambiguity
affects the regulation of immigration and access to citizenship was noted in
the United States in the nineteenth century. However, the general trend
toward nationalization of U.S. politics in the post-Civil War epoch dispelled
most of the ambiguities in this sphere, and immigration-nationality matters
became clearly national as well.35
Elsewhere, however, there seems to be an emerging trend in the other
direction, particularly in countries where federalism is based on the
persistence of identifiable cultural or national characteristics. The most
indicative case is that of Canada, where Qu6bec's special status is indicated
by its establishment of what amounts to unofficial diplomatic representation
32. Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-13 (1983).
33. See, e.g., Aristide R. Zolberg, Responses to Crisis-Refugee Policy in the United States and
Canada, in IMMIGRATION, LANGUAGE, AND ETHNICITY: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 55 (Barry
R. Chiswick ed., 1992).
34. James Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 129 (1990).
35. EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-
1965, at 45, 47-84 (1981).
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abroad, and also the incorporation of provincial considerations into Canadian
immigration policy. Immigration is of special importance because the
province seeks to avoid the settlement of immigrants who are more likely
to become English-speaking rather than French-speaking. Although this
might seem theoretically unenforceable, since once newcomers have settled
.in any Canadian state they are free to change their residence at will, the
process of initial screening has apparently been largely effective in bringing
about the desired result.
Although California or Florida might well envy Quebec's privileged
status with regard to immigration, it is unlikely that constitutional
jurisprudence would allow such a development in the United States.
However, it should be noted that those two states, as well as a number of
others, have undertaken to shape their cultural identity by asserting the
exclusivity of English as their official language.
With location emerging as the dialectical counterpoint to globalism,
there are good reasons to expect that localism, and with it the imposition by
sub-national groups of restrictions on immigration or settlement or of
qualifications on incorporation, will emerge as a general trend (e.g., in
France and Italy). At a minimum, the preferences of impacted communities
are likely to carry increasing weight in national immigration policies.
F. The Formation of Quasi-States
Many of the countries that achieved formal sovereignty through
decolonization in the post-World War II period emerged as extremely weak
States. That is, they emerged with a level of institutional capacity-of
"infrastructural power," in Michael Mann's useful
conceptualization 36-well below the minimum level one usually associates
with the notion of "sovereign State." Looking at the phenomenon from the
perspective of the international system, Robert Jackson has suggested that
decolonization brought with it an unprecedented disjunction between
"negative" and "positive" sovereignty-that is, between sovereignty in the
traditional sense and empirical Statehood, producing "quasi-States.""
36. Michael Mann, The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,
25 EUR. ARCHIVES SOC. 185 (1984).
37. ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE
THIRD WORLD (1990).
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Whereas in the past, States gained sovereignty only if they mustered the
internal capacity to withstand the challenges of other States at the
international level, in the contemporary world the situation is partially
reversed, in that some of the new States are able to maintain their
sovereignty only with the support of the international system.38
While decolonization has certainly resulted in the proliferation of "weak
States," Jackson exaggerates the newness of the phenomenon; indeed he
himself acknowledges that the "new sovereignty game" originated under the
League of Nations, when the application of the principle of national self-
determination produced a plethora of countries in the Balkans and northern
Europe whose capacity for "empirical" Statehood was open to question.39
In any case, it is quite evident that the resumption of imperial disintegration
within eastern Europe following the collapse of Communism is producing
additional "quasi-States."
Weak States are prone to protracted internal conflicts, and due to the
widespread availability of cheap, rapid-fire weapons, such conflicts are
likely to involve high levels of violence. Already a reality in a number of
African States-notably Liberia, Somalia, and Rwanda-the specter of
anarchy also looms in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Haiti."
IV. CONCLUSION
From the vantage point of international population movements, the most
important consequence of these profound changes in the structure of the
international system is the generation of large flows of internally and
externally displaced persons who lack the sort of protection States normally
accord their citizens, but who on the whole do not fit the statutory definition
of "refugee" embedded in international law and in the laws of most States
since their predicaments do not clearly result from "persecution." Without
the benefit of sovereign protection displaced persons must rely on the
38. Id. For an early exploration of the "weak State," see ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, CREATING
POLITICAL ORDER: THE PARTY-STATES OF WEST AFRICA (Myron Weiner ed., 1966); for their
relationship to the international system, see Aristide R. Zolberg, A View from the Congo, 19 WORLD POL.
136 (1967).
39. JACKSON, supra note 37, at 40-47.
40. For a more elaborate discussion of some aspects and implications of this phenomenon, see
ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG ET AL., ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE (1989), and Aristide R. Zolberg, The Specter of
Anarchy, 39 DISSENT 303 (1992).
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international community. At the same time, the international community,
as presently constituted, appears unable or unwilling to meet their needs.
Although "globalism" is a term often used to describe a coming golden
age of economic and cultural borderlessness, persistent economic disparities
as well as recent ethnic conflicts and other examples of extreme
parochialism such as widespread anti-immigration rhetoric and legislation,
all of which evince an astonishing resistance to changes in the traditional
methods of societal organization, suggest that the modern world may face
great upheaval and loss on its way to globalism. Nevertheless, other
developments such as the movement toward the "Open Republic" are more
encouraging.4 As people, businesses, and ideas become increasingly
dispersed, the world's nations may come to better understand one another,
and therefore be better able to coexist. At a minimum this commingling
will profoundly affect the character of modern nations.
41. Jost Delbrfick, Global Migration-mmigration-Multiethnicity: Challenges to the Concept
of the Nation-State, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 45, 57-64 (1994).
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